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ABSTRACT 
Competition Policy Trends and Economic Growth: Cross-National 
Empirical Evidence * 
by Joseph A. Clougherty 
Motivated by the general lack of empirical scholarship concerning the cross-
national environment for competition policy, I present measures here of the 
overall resources dedicated to competition policy and the merger policy work-
load for thirty-two antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2007 period. The data 
allow analysing a number of perceived trends in competition policy over the last 
two decades, and allow the generation of some factual insights concerning 
these trends: e.g., the budgetary commitment to competition policy in the cross-
national environment for antitrust has substantially increased over this period; 
budgetary increases appear to be commensurate with increased antitrust 
workloads; yet, the role of economics does not appear to have substantially 
increased relative to the role of law. Moreover, I am also able to provide some 
evidence that budgetary commitments to antitrust institutions yield economic 
benefits in terms of improved economic growth: i.e., higher budgetary 
commitments to competition policy are associated with higher levels per-capita 
GDP growth. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Entwicklungen in der Wettbewerbspolitik und Wirtschaftswachstum: Eine 
länderübergreifende empirische Untersuchung 
Zu den Rahmenbedingungen für Wettbewerbspolitik gibt es kaum 
länderübergreifende empirische Forschung. Dieser Mangel soll in der 
vorliegenden Studie behoben werden, in der die Gesamtausgaben für 
Wettbewerbspolitik und die Arbeitsbelastungen von 32 Kartellbehörden im 
Zeitraum von 1992 bis 2007 untersucht werden. Die Daten bieten die 
Möglichkeit, eine Anzahl von erkennbaren Entwicklungen in der 
Wettbewerbspolitik innerhalb der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte zu analysieren. 
Folgende Erkenntnisse resultieren: die Gesamtausgaben für Wettbewerbspolitik 
sind länderübergreifend in der betrachteten Periode erheblich gestiegen; zur 
Etatsteigerungen sind auch die Arbeitsbelastungen der Behördenmitarbeiter 
entsprechend gestiegen; dabei hat die ökonomische Expertise jedoch im 
Vergleich zur juristischen offenbar nicht an Einfluss auf die Wettbewerbspolitik 
gewonnen. Außerdem kann gezeigt werden, dass die Bereitstellung von 
finanziellen Mitteln für die Wettbewerbbehörden eines Landes wirtschaftlichen 
Nutzen stiftet, was sich in einem höheren Wirtschaftswachstum gemessen als 
höheres BIP-Wachstum pro Kopf niederschlägt. 
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1. Introduction 
In most developed economies, the attention given to competition policy in the political 
agenda has increased substantially over the last two decades. While a number of antitrust 
jurisdictions exhibit long-standing commitments to antitrust principles (e.g., the US, Germany 
& the EU), other developed economies (particularly small economies that traditionally relied 
on trade policy to discipline markets) have recently introduced or substantially enhanced pre-
existing competition policies (OECD, 2008; Boner and Krueger, 1991). Accordingly, we 
witness developments in support of these objectives: the introduction of new competition laws 
to formally change the institutional environment for antitrust enforcement (Palim, 1998); and 
the introduction of new competition authorities to enforce these laws (e.g., Portugal's PCA, 
and the Dutch NMa). In short, the last two decades appear to have experienced a number of 
substantial changes to the competition policies of many nations. 
Despite observations of significant change across nations, we have surprisingly little 
quantitative empirical evidence on the state of competition policy in the cross-national 
context. A number of studies certainly attempt to survey the developments in cross-national 
competition policy (e.g., Boner and Krueger, 1991; Doern and Wilks, 1996; Röller, Stennek, 
and Verboven, 2000), but these studies rely exclusively on expert opinion and comparative 
case analysis.1 Instead, the majority of quantitative empirical work on competition policy 
appears to be embedded in one antitrust jurisdiction – that nation often being the US.2 The 
scarcity of hard empirical evidence is in part driven by the severe data limitations with regard 
to analyzing one nation’s competition policy (Horn and Levinsohn, 2001)—such problems are 
                                                 
1 Palim's (1998) empirical analysis of cross-national competition laws, the assessment by Dutz and Vagliasindi 
(2000) of the impact of transition nation’s competition policy on firm mobility, and the consideration of how 
different commitments to competition policy impact TFP growth (Voigt, 2006, Buccirossi et al., 2009) represent 
exceptions to this point. 
2 Quantitative empirical work on US competition policy includes: Kwoka, 1999; Ghosal, 2002; Clougherty, 
2005; Clougherty and Zhang, 2005. Quantitative empirical work on EU competition policy includes: Bergman, 
Jakobsson and Razo, 2003; Duso, Neven and Röller, 2007; Neven, Papandropoulos, and Seabright, 1998. 
Quantitative empirical work on German and Norwegian competition policy respectively includes: Lauk, 2002; 
and Nilssen, 1997.  
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of course compounded when one seeks to measure the competition policies in multiple 
nations. 
Despite the stated difficulties, I aim to go beyond the case of a single antitrust 
jurisdiction and employ quantitative empirical evidence to analyze the cross-national 
environment for competition policy. In order to do so, I have compiled a unique data set that 
allows comparing experiences and trends across antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2007 
period. While a number of inquiry areas come to mind when considering how economic 
analysis can contribute to an improved knowledge about the state of cross-national 
competition policy, the data more readily allow analysing two particular areas of interest: 1) 
the detection of broad trends in competition policy and practice over the period of study; 2) 
the impact of competition policy on economic growth. The first area of interest is motivated 
by the fact that a great deal of the received wisdom regarding competition policy has not been 
empirically tested: in short, there are far too many ‘perceived’ stylized facts out there. The 
second area of interest is guided by the perspective that competition policy can act as an 
intermediate input in to the economy: a facilitating device that promotes economic growth via 
the competitiveness of industry and firms.  
The paper is organized as follows in order to support the analysis. Since the novelty of 
providing empirical evidence on the cross-national context for competition policy represents 
one of the defining features of this analysis, the next section describes the primary data in 
detail. The third section presents descriptive empirical analysis of trends in the cross-national 
environment for competition policy. The fourth section presents empirical analysis of how 
competition policy might impact economic growth. The fifth section concludes. 
 
2. The Data  
The actual data consist of annual measures of competition policy for 32 antitrust 
jurisdictions over the 1992-2007 period. The OECD directs members and associates to 
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respond to specific questions in order to generate annual reports on the state of competition 
policy in those jurisdictions. Thus, the OECD's annual reports on 'Competition Policy in 
OECD Countries' provide raw data on cross-national competition policies that can be 
compiled into empirical measures. While the OECD reports are the main source of data for 
this study, additional data were gathered via direct contact with – and specific reports from – 
actual antitrust authorities in order to fill any data holes and reconcile any incompatibilities. 
The overriding concern in data compilation was to create consistently accurate measures of 
national competition policies. In doing so, the data are necessarily characterized as 
unbalanced panels—as a number of annual observations were missing or necessarily dropped 
in order to yield consistent cross-jurisdiction/cross-time measures.3 
The actual empirical constructs concerning competition policy fall into two categories: 
overall resources and merger work-load. First, I have three measures concerning the resources 
which antitrust authorities can bring to bear in undertaking competition policies: 'Antitrust-
Budget' refers to the yearly budget – measured in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) 
dollars – upon which the authority(s) can conduct competition policy. 'Economists' refers to 
the number of trained economists the authority(s) has in order to engage in competition policy 
analysis. 'Lawyers' refers to the number of trained lawyers the authority(s) has in order to 
engage in competition policy legal analysis and litigation.4 Second, I have one measure 
concerning the merger policy work-load faced by antitrust authorities: 'Notified Transactions' 
refers to the annual number of transactions (mergers, acquisitions and alliances) that are 
notified in the antitrust jurisdiction. Unfortunately, I do not have data concerning the non-
merger related workload (e.g., abuse-of-dominance and collusion cases) faced by antitrust 
authorities.  
                                                 
3 See Clougherty (2005) and Seldeslachts, Clougherty and Barros (2009) for papers that also employ OECD data 
while studying the cross-national context for competition policy. 
4 Note that ‘Economists’ and ‘Lawyers’ refers to the profession of the employee but not the training, thus we 
have no data, for example, on whether the Economists have attained a PhD or not. 
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The above partially capture the resources and workload (at least with respect to merger 
policy) for the 32 different antitrust jurisdictions in the sample. Furthermore, I will match up 
the above data on competition policy with standard macroeconomic measures drawn from a 
variety of different sources (OECD’s Factbook, World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, and others). Table 1 lists the main variables employed – along with their 
definitions and sources – for the analysis of competition policy trends, and the relationship 
between competition policy expenditures and economic growth.  
*** put Table 1 near here *** 
 
3. Trends in Cross-National Competition Policy 
Before engaging in more structured analysis concerning competition policy and 
economic growth, it can be illustrative to have a look at basic trends in the resources used and 
the output generated by competition authorities in the cross-national context. The following 
questions concerning the 1992-2007 period for cross-national competition policy motivate 
this particular analysis: 1) how does growth in antitrust budgets compare to economic growth; 
2) are the increases in antitrust budgets commensurate with enhanced antitrust workloads; 3) 
is the role of economics (economists) ascendant relative to law (lawyers) over the period of 
study? 
Table 2 reports the mean growth rate for per-capita GDP, Antitrust Budget, Notified 
Transactions and the Economist/Lawyer ratio for all thirty-two jurisdictions in the data set. 
The comparison between column 1 (mean change in per-capita GDP measured in constant 
PPP terms) and column 2 (mean change in antitrust budgets measured in constant PPP terms) 
suggests that the monetary commitment of governments to competition policy has far 
outpaced economic growth in the sample. For all the observations in the data set, per capita 
GDP grew annually by 2.14 percent on average; yet, antitrust budgets grew annually by 18.05 
percent on average. Only Argentina and Belgium exhibit lower growth in antitrust budgets as 
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compared to per capita GDP growth. Clearly, political authorities have substantially increased 
their financial commitments to competition policy over the last decade. The comparison 
between column 2 (mean change in Antitrust-Budget measured in constant PPP terms) and 
column 3 (mean change in Notified-Transactions) allows gathering whether increased 
budgetary commitments to competition policy match any increases in antitrust workload. The 
evidence here suggests that increases in antitrust budgets have kept up with increases in 
notified transactions: with the number of notified transactions increasing by 15.04 percent on 
average, and antitrust budgets increasing by 18.05 percent on average for all observations 
over the period of study. 
*** put Table 2 near here *** 
Figure 1 presents illustrative evidence that corroborates that antitrust budgets have 
generally kept up with the increased pace of notified transactions in the sample of the cross-
national environment for competition policy. The figure shows the yearly average change 
(1994-2007) for these two variables for all thirty-two jurisdictions, and indicates that any 
upsurge – or down surge – in merger activity (Notified-Transactions) is met by a 
corresponding change in antitrust budgets. That said, changes to antitrust budgets do appear to 
somewhat lag any changes to notified transactions; nevertheless, budgets ultimately do 
respond to changes in the merger wave.  
*** put Figure 1 near here *** 
The evidence above contradicts Kwoka's (1999) finding that US antitrust financial 
resources in the 1990s fell short of the antitrust needs during that period. This finding is line 
with the idea that the cross-national environment for competition policy exhibits a 
strengthening in policy – reflected in strong financial commitments – over the last few 
decades that out strips the marginal commitments to US antitrust policy. It should be pointed 
out, however, that cross-national antitrust authorities have other competition policy concerns 
(e.g., controlling collusion and anti-competitive behaviour) that will often be put on hold 
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during merger waves in order to devote proper resources to vetting mergers. Accordingly, the 
commensurate budgetary increases might not even totally reflect the response by cross-
national competition policies to the 1990s merger wave. While I lack measures of the non-
merger actions taken by antitrust authorities that would help settle this issue, I do have 
another means to gather whether antitrust authorities became more stringent during the 
merger wave of the mid-to-late 1990s.  
I know the annual number of merger policy actions (prohibitions, remedies and 
monitorings) in an antitrust jurisdiction for the 1993-2005 period. Accordingly, figure 2 
presents illustrative evidence on the relationship between notified-transactions and merger-
policy-actions by taking the average yearly percentage of notified mergers that elicit merger-
policy actions for all observations—and for a sub-sample of observations. The sub-sample 
consists of five antitrust jurisdictions: Canada, European Union, Germany, United Kingdom 
and United States (referred to as the Big 5). These five jurisdictions all have relatively long 
standing commitments to competition policy; hence, the five jurisdictions act as a good 
robustness check to make sure any trends detected for All-Authorities are not driven strictly 
by the observations of less experienced authorities—authorities that may be embarking on 
new, or substantially beefed-up, competition policies. Figure 2 clearly illustrates that the 
percentage of M&As eliciting merger policy actions actually increased over the period of 
study. Consider that the merger wave peaked in 2000; hence, merger policy appears to have 
gotten tougher both before and after the peak of the wave. Accordingly, this evidence 
suggests that cross-national antitrust jurisdictions were indeed able to properly vet the merger 
wave of the mid-to-late 1990s, and moreover were potentially engaging in increasingly 
stringent merger policy over the period of study.5  
                                                 
5 It should be pointed out that a number of authorities underwent changes to their merger notifications’ 
procedures over this time period that generally increased merger notification thresholds. Accordingly, the 
upward trend witnessed in Figure 2 may actually be indicating that the merger authorities are simply better able 
to ‘separate the wheat from the chaff’ under the new threshold procedures. Unfortunately, virtually every 
authority incurred at least one change in notification threshold during the period of study, thus it does not make 
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*** put Figure 2 near here *** 
Another important trend that has been suggested to be present in recent years is the 
increased role of economic analysis in shaping competition policy and antitrust enforcement. 
Enhanced competition policy is in part the direct result of large-scale deregulation of many 
industries in the cross-national environment. As with regulatory policy – where economic 
ideas (and economists) were ascendant relative to legalistic ideas (see Derthick and Quirk, 
1985; Winston, 1993) – the expectation would be for economic ideas, analysis and people to 
be ascendant in the realm of competition policy over the last decade relative to legal ideas, 
analysis and people. Although an imperfect indicator, I take the ratio of economists to lawyers 
working for an antitrust jurisdiction as a proxy for this effect. Figure 3 presents the ratio of 
economists to lawyers for All-Authorities and for the Big-5 authorities.6 The figure illustrates 
that for the All-Authorities sample, the ratio of economists to lawyers first increased (in 1993 
there were some .42 economists for every lawyer, but by 1998 there were .74 economists for 
every lawyer) and then decreased (by 2007 there were some .49 economists for every 
lawyer)—this does still, of course, represent a general increase from 1993 to 2007. The Big 5 
ratio is far-more steady: hovering more consistently around a ratio of some .3 economists for 
every lawyer. Consequently, if the ratio of economists to lawyers accurately reflects the 
relative importance of economic ideas in competition policy; then, the role of economics has 
substantially increased over the 1993-1998 period – and decreased over the 1998-2007 period 
– in the less experienced antitrust jurisdictions, while it has remained stable in the more 
experienced antitrust jurisdictions. 
*** put Figure 3 near here *** 
                                                                                                                                                        
sense to sub-sample the data and report equivalent figures for both authorities with and without threshold 
changes. The same applies for Figure 1. 
6 The yearly ratio of economists to lawyers was created not by taking the average of the cross-national ratios, but 
instead by summing up all the economists and all the lawyers working for all authorities (or the Big 5 
authorities) and then taking the ratio of that sum. Accordingly, the reported ratios are weighted by the various 
antitrust jurisdictions’ staff sizes. 
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In concluding, recall that three questions motivated the analysis here of trends in the 
cross-national environment for competition policy: 1) how does growth in antitrust budgets 
compare to economic growth; 2) are the increases in antitrust budgets commensurate with 
increases in antitrust workload; 3) is the role of economics (economists) ascendant relative to 
law (lawyers) over the period of study? I found evidence in support of the following over the 
1992-2007 period: (1st) antitrust budgets have been growing much more robustly than the 
national economies in this sample; (2nd) antitrust budgets appear to have increased in line with 
the increased workload for antitrust authorities, and antitrust authorities appear to have been 
able to properly vet the merger wave of the 1990s; (3rd) the role of economics – at least as 
measured by the ratio of economists to lawyers – does not appear to be substantially 
increasing over this study period for experienced authorities, however less-experienced 
authorities indicate an upward trend in the role of economics followed by a downward trend. 
 
4. Competition Policy & Growth 
 Following the above analysis of trends in competition policy, the most natural 
question is what economic benefits nations receive with respect to investing in competition 
policy. For instance, the influence of a variety of public policies (e.g., monetary, fiscal, 
labour, regulatory, and trade) on economic growth has been a question of particular interest 
for both economic researchers and government officials. Ahn and Hemmings (2000) provide 
an excellent review of the vast literature on the policy determinants of economic growth, and 
observe that “the efficiency of markets for goods and services and the incentives for 
innovation created by competition policy and other regulatory frameworks potentially have an 
important influence on growth” (p. 44). Consider also the theoretical work – e.g., Porter 
(1990), and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) – that sets conditions for when domestic 
competition can enhance the effort of firms and thereby enhance economic growth. In line 
with the proposition that intense competition breeds growth, the relationship between 
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international trade openness and economic growth has been widely investigated for empirical 
regularities (Ahn and Hemmings, 2000). Further, the relationship between regulatory policy 
and economic growth has received increased interest by empiricists (e.g., Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2003).  
Surprisingly, however, very little literature exists concerning the impact of 
competition policy on economy-wide growth. In fact, Dutz and Hayri (1999) represents the 
only study I was able to identify concerning competition policy and economic growth; 
though, Voigt (2006) and Buccirossi et al. (2009) consider the impact of competition policy 
on TFP growth. Further, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find antitrust exemptions for public 
enterprises and product market regulation to negatively effect growth; yet, regulatory – not 
competition – policy is the focus of their work. While Dutz and Hayri find evidence in 
support of better domestic competition policy leading to increased economic growth, they 
base their findings on survey data found in the 1996 ‘World Competitiveness Report’: where 
a question was asked concerning the respondents ‘perception that antitrust is effectively 
promoting competition’. This measure of national competition policy does not vary over time; 
thus, any captured beneficial effects are strictly driven by between-nation (not within-nation) 
variation. Further, Voigt (2006) critiques this approach and shows that competition-policy 
effects are not robust to including a measure of the general quality of national institutions. My 
aim here is too add to this literature by testing whether a less-subjective measure of 
competition policy that varies over time (national government expenditures on competition 
policy) contributes to economy-wide growth while controlling for the general effectiveness of 
national institutions. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) note that no consensus exists vis-à-vis a theoretical 
framework to guide empirical work on growth; hence, no complete specification exists 
concerning what variables “should be held constant while conducting statistical inference on 
the relationship between growth and the variables of primary interest” (p. 943). Nevertheless, 
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a few studies over the last decade have observed that some core explanatory variables 
regarding growth models are manifest in the literature. Dutz and Hayri (1999) identify four 
core constructs: a convergence effect; a trade-openness effect; a human-capital effect; and a 
physical-capital-investment effect. Ahn and Hemmings (2000) identify the same four 
constructs, and also identify population growth and inflation as core constructs. In fact, even 
Levine and Renelt (1992) cite the above six constructs as standard control variables in the 
literature—these six variables constitute two-thirds of the constructs they use in their 
influential extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) of economic-growth drivers.7 In keeping with the 
above literature and in order to make inferences on the relationship between competition 
policy and economic growth, I compile measures to capture the effects of these six standard 
constructs: 
First, it is imperative to control for previous levels of GDP (the convergence effect 
noted above), as relatively poor nations are expected to experience greater growth than 
relatively rich nations: i.e., it is no surprise that the growth rates in China currently outflank 
those in developed nations. Accordingly, the lagged per capita GDP level in constant PPP 
terms (hereafter referred to as Per-Capita-GDP) controls for prior levels of economic 
development—what is sometimes referred to as the ‘initial condition effect’.  
Second, studies support a relationship between investment in physical capital and 
economic growth. Akin to the majority of empirical growth studies, I use the percentage of 
gross capital formation relative to GDP (hereafter referred to as Physical-Capital) in order to 
measure the impact of new capital expenditures on GDP growth.  
Third, human capital accumulation has also been found to have an important impact 
on economic growth. Despite general agreement on the importance of factoring human capital 
formation in the growth process, the data quality on this construct is particularly bad (see De 
                                                 
7 The additional three constructs utilized by Levine and Renelt (1992) include: government consumption 
expenditures, the growth rate of domestic credit, and an index for the number of revolutions and coups. 
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la Fuente and Domenech’s (2006) addressing of this issue). While Dutz and Hayri (1999) use 
life-expectancy to proxy human capital, Ahn and Hemmings (2000) note that schooling-levels 
have also been used in order to tease out cross-country human capital differences. 
Accordingly, I employ the percentage of the national population between 25 and 64 attaining 
a tertiary – i.e., higher – education level to proxy for human capital (hereafter referred to as 
Human-Capital), but are mindful of its deficiencies.  
Fourth, a substantial amount of literature suggests—as previously noted—that trade-
openness fundamentally affects economic growth (e.g., Hoeller, Girouard and Colecchia, 
1998; Ahn and Hemmings, 2000). Accordingly, I include exports as a percentage of GDP 
(hereafter Openness) to measure the impact of a nation being open to the world trade system.  
Fifth, population growth has also been found to negatively impact growth rates. The 
negative relationship between population and economic growth reflects a number of 
mechanisms: the strongest evidence suggesting that population growth involves an increasing 
dependency ratio that dampens growth in GDP per capita. Accordingly, I include the annual 
rate of population growth (hereafter Population-Growth) to capture this effect. 
Sixth, the inflation rate for the economy is also included as a control variable, as high 
inflation has been generally found to be damaging for long-run economic growth. National 
macroeconomic policies often attempt to reduce inflation due to a variety of perceived 
benefits from such actions: 1) ensuring that the damaging effects of hyper-inflation are not 
experienced: 2) mitigating the uncertainty that comes with inflation; 3) minimizing any 
relative price distortions in the domestic market; 4) enhancing the credibility of monetary 
policy (Ahn and Hemmings, 2000). Accordingly, the annual inflation rate for a national 
economy (hereafter Inflation) is controlled for. 
As already alluded to above, I must control for an additional construct: the general 
effectiveness of a nation’s political institutions. Voigt (2006) points out that there is a high 
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correlation between government effectiveness indicators and measures of competition policy. 
Accordingly, measures of competition policy may actually be reflecting institutional quality 
factors instead of more focused government efforts regarding competition policy. Thus, it 
behoves one to include – akin to Voigt (2006) – Kaufmann et al.’s (2008) measure of the 
general quality of a nation’s institutions (hereafter Government-Effectiveness) in order to 
elicit more robust inferences on the impact of antitrust budgets on growth. 
 
4.1. Estimation Issues 
 The discussion above identified the six core explanatory constructs found in the 
economic growth literature, the additional government effectiveness issue per Voigt (2006), 
and the measures I was able to gather in order to capture those effects. It is also important to 
identify the two constructs of primary interest here: i.e., the relationship between economic-
growth and competition-policy. The standard dependent variable for empirical work on 
growth is the percentage change in real per-capita GDP. Hence, I adopt the yearly percent 
change in real per-capita GDP measured in PPP terms as the dependent variable (hereafter 
referred to as Growth). The explanatory variable of principal interest is a nation’s 
commitment to competition policy. As already noted, I use the annual budgetary resources – 
measured in PPP terms – devoted to competition policy, as a measure of the commitment to 
competition policy (referred to as Antitrust-Budget).  
The actual data employed for the estimated growth model consist—at the most 
detailed level of abstraction—of annual measures for twenty-five national antitrust 
jurisdictions over the 1996-2007 period.8 Properly analyzing the data, however, requires the 
                                                 
8 The EU and six of the national antitrust jurisdictions from Table 2 (Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Italy, 
and Portugal) were dropped from this analysis as they had more than seven observations missing for the variable 
of key interest. Further, the data on government effectiveness only extends from 1996-2007; hence, the 
regressions based on annual observations span the 1996-2007 period and do not include observations on years 
prior to 1996. Since Voigt’s (2006) work is so clear on this point, including the Government-Effectiveness 
variable appears to be worth the sacrifice in observation numbers. 
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consideration of a few econometric issues: level-of-analysis for observations; choice between 
fixed and random effects; and the appropriateness of period effects. 
First, the custom for empirical work on economic growth is to average growth over a 
ten to twenty year period in order to smooth out any business cycle effects and then estimate 
cross-sectional (i.e., cross-national) models. In that vein, Fölster and Henrekson (1999) note 
that “estimating relationships using annual data can be dominated by mistiming and thus by 
measurement error” (p. 349). Nevertheless, Fölster and Henrekson also argue that growth 
estimations must move beyond cross-sectional methods for a couple of reasons: first, to 
reduce the simultaneity bias that is rife in cross-national regressions where both left and right 
hand-side variables are averaged over a long period; second, to take advantage of potential 
within-country variation. Recall that Table 2 suggests a great deal of variation in terms of 
national commitments to competition policy over the 1992-2007 period. With these same 
rationales as a backdrop, Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001), and Hoeller, Girouard 
and Colecchia (1998) all argue for and employ panel-data methods in their empirical work on 
growth. When adopting a yearly level-of-analysis, however, it becomes imperative to control 
for both the annual inflation rate – already noted above as a control variable – and the annual 
unemployment rate in the labour force (hereafter referred to as Unemployment). In short, 
macroeconomic variables, e.g., inflation and unemployment, must be included as control 
variables in order to partially capture the business cycle and mitigate mistiming and 
measurement-error problems.   
Second, estimating panel data regression models often implies a choice between a 
fixed-effects specification and a random-effects specification. The relatively small degrees-of-
freedom (only 42 observations for the panel treatments with five-year averages) available 
favours the adoption of random effects. Greene (1990) points out that fixed-effects involve a 
large loss of degrees-of-freedom; thus, yielding practical merits for the choice of random-
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effects when observations are limited. Nevertheless, diagnostics – F test for No Fixed Effects 
and Hausman Test for Random Effects – suggest the appropriateness of the fixed-effects 
method. In addition, fixed-effects is the more conservative route when data are characterized 
as unbalanced panels.  
Third, a number of potential changes have occurred in the cross-national environment 
for antitrust and economic growth over the 1992-2007 period—changes that create time-
specific data trends, affect inferences, and call for the addition of period-effects. For example, 
the addition of period effects helps control for macroeconomic trends that affect yearly 
growth in all nations; thus, partially addressing the concerns noted above vis-à-vis business 
cycles.  
The six reported regression equations in Table 3 take the above econometric concerns 
into account. The first three regressions use the full variation involved with annual 
observations by keeping the unit of analysis at the country-year. The second three regressions 
take five-year averages of the various constructs for each country – in keeping with the 
growth literature (e.g., Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999; Fölster and Henrekson, 2001) – 
thus the temporal unit of analysis consists of three periods: averages for 1993-1997, 1998-
2002, and 2003-2007.9 Furthermore, I report a basic OLS specification, a random-effects 
specification, and a fixed-effects specification – with the OLS and random-effects 
specifications representing good robustness checks for the fixed-effects results. Furthermore, 
a fixed period-specific effect is included in all six regressions.  
Since the fixed-effects specification is both econometrically-conservative and readily-
expressible, it is represented here: 
Growthit = b0 + b1 (Antitrust-Budget)it-1 + b2 (Per-Capita-GDP)it-1 +   
b3 (Physical-Capital)it + b4 (Human-Capital)it + b5 (Openness)it-1 +  
                                                 
9 If a couple of annual observations are missing within the five-year average, I compute the average based on the 
available observations in order to preserve degrees of freedom. 
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b6 (Population-Growth)it +  b7 (Inflation)it +  b8 (Unemployment)it +  
b9 (Government-Effectiveness)it + εit + αi + γt 
where i indexes the twenty-five national antitrust jurisdictions, t indexes time (annual or 5-
year averages), αi represents the fixed panel specific effect, and γt captures the fixed period 
specific effect. 
 
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
As already mentioned, Table 3 reports the estimation results for the six regression 
models. It is important that the regression models be reasonably well-specified and behave in 
accordance with prior theory and empirical work in order to be reasonably confident 
regarding inferences concerning the competition-policy/economic-growth relationship. While 
the models appear to yield results that are generally consistent with expectations, the 
following analysis takes a variable-by-variable approach to ensure that the control variables 
conform with both prediction and previous empirical growth work. 
• The coefficient estimate for Per-Capita-GDP (the convergence effect) is negative and 
statistically significant in five of the six regression models. This conforms to 
expectation and with the economic growth literature: nations with higher levels of 
income generally grow slower than do nations with lower levels of income.  
• The coefficient estimate for Physical-Capital is positive and significant as expected in 
the first three regression models (where annual data is employed); though, 
insignificant in the last three regression models (where 5-year average data is 
employed). Accordingly, the estimations yield some evidence in support of the 
prediction that investments in physical-capital generate positive economic growth.  
• The coefficient estimate for Human-Capital is insignificant in all the regression 
models except for #6—and there it is negative. The lack of conformance with 
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prediction may owe to the deficiencies of the proxy used for Human-Capital: tertiary 
education attainment. It stands to reason that this measure will not vary considerably 
for a nation over a fifteen year period; thus, its’ poor performance does make intuitive 
sense.  
• The coefficient estimate for Openness is positive and significant as expected in all six 
regression models: the positive impact of Openness on Growth appears to be the most 
statistically robust control effect in the estimation treatments.  
• The coefficient estimate for Population-Growth is insignificant in all six regression 
models. Accordingly, the estimations yield little evidence in support of the prediction 
that population growth leads to negative economic growth.  
• The coefficient estimates for Inflation are negative and significant in the first five 
regression models, thus conforming to prediction that inflation reduces economic 
growth. 
• The coefficient estimates for Unemployment are insignificant in all of the regression 
models. 
• Finally, the coefficient-estimates for Government-Effectiveness are positive and 
significant in regression models’ #2, #3 & #6; thus, lending some support to the 
literature on general institutional quality setting the conditions for economic growth. 
 
In sum the eight control variables do not perform perfectly, but they are reasonably 
consistent with a priori expectations and the existing empirical literature on economic 
growth. Accordingly, we should infer a degree of confidence that the regression models are 
relatively well specified and thus allow inferences regarding the relationship of primary 
concern: competition-policy and economic-growth. Turning now to the explanatory variable 
of principal concern, the coefficient estimates for Antitrust-Budget is positive and significant 
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in all six regression models. Accordingly, the estimations yield evidence in support of the 
prediction that commitments to competition policy correlate with positive economic growth.  
As already noted, Regression #3 (the fixed-effects estimation with annual 
observations) could be considered the more econometrically conservative estimation 
technique; hence, further interpreting that coefficient estimate (14.31) for economic 
significance involves merit. The coefficient estimate suggests that an increase to the mean 
level of competition policy funding in the sample by one standard-deviation ($58.8 million) 
would result in increased economic growth by 0.84 percentage points on average. 
Furthermore, the UK’s growing commitment of resources to competition policy (a $23 
million difference between its lowest level in 1998 and maximum level in 2005) suggests that 
the UK would experience increased yearly economic growth of some 0.33 percentage points 
on average due to its increased commitment of budgetary resources to competition policy. I 
can also do some cross-country comparisons to illustrate the potential impact of different 
national commitments to competition policy. For instance, the UK’s relatively strong 
commitment of resources to competition policy ($18 million on average for our sample) 
compared with France’s relatively weak commitment of resources to competition policy ($8.3 
million on average) suggests that British economic growth – holding other things constant – 
would be some 0.14 percentage points higher than that in France due to its higher 
commitment to competition policy.  
 
5. Conclusion 
I have compiled a unique cross-national data set on the state of national competition 
policies for the 1992-2007 period. While a number of pundits make observations on the cross-
national environment for competition policy, few studies bring empirical evidence to bear on 
this issue. The broad scope of the data allows consideration of a number of important 
questions regarding the state of competition-policy in the cross-national environment: 1) can 
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we detect any broad trends in competition policy and practice over the last two decades; 2) is 
there a relationship between national commitments to competition policy and economy-wide 
growth? The empirical results suggest the following: 
First, in terms of important trends in cross-national competition policy: it appears that 
political authorities have been dedicating larger levels of resources to antitrust authorities over 
the last two decades. Antitrust budgets have grown substantially, and the budgets appear to be 
increasing in line with the increased workload for antitrust authorities (particularly with the 
unprecedented merger-wave of the mid-to-late 1990s). Furthermore, the percentage of 
mergers eliciting merger-policy actions actually increased consistently over the 1993-2005 
period. However, there appears to be no evidence that the role of economics is ascendant 
relative to the role of law – as measured by the ratio of economists to lawyers – over the 
1993-2007 period. It should be pointed out, however, that there is some evidence with respect 
to an increased role for economics (economists) being manifest in less experienced antitrust 
jurisdictions.  
Second, in terms of competition-policy being an important factor in what drives 
overall economic growth in a national economy: I found supportive evidence that competition 
policy (or at least a nation’s budgetary commitment to competition policy) plays a positive 
role in economic growth. The empirical tests here are not definitive, but they do suggest that 
competition policy is yet another public policy that could have some explanatory power when 
it comes to defining the source of economic wealth. 
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Table 1: Variables, Sources and Definitions  
Variable Source Definition 
Growth World Bank’s WDI GDP per capita growth as an annual percentage change 
 
Antitrust-Budget OECD (2008) 
 
Total Antitrust Budget in PPP terms in international USD 
Per-Capita GDP World Bank’s WDI GDP per capita in PPP terms in constant 2005 international USD 
 
Physical-Capital World Bank’s WDI Gross capital formation as a Share of GDP 
 
Openness World Bank’s WDI Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP 
 
Human-Capital OECD Factbook Tertiary attainment for age group 25- 64 as a share of the population of that 
age group 
 
Population-Growth World Bank’s WDI Annual growth of the population 
 
Inflation World Bank’s WDI Annual Inflation rate 
 
Unemployment World Bank’s WDI Unemployment as a share of the total labour force. 
 
Government-
Effectiveness 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2008) 
Indicator (ranging from -2.5 to 2.5) measuring perceptions of the quality of 
public services, quality and independence of the civil service, quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
 
Notified-
Transactions 
OECD (2008) 
 
 
Number of mergers, acquisitions and alliances notified to the antitrust 
authorities. 
Economists-
Lawyer Ratio 
OECD (2008) 
 
Ratio of economists to lawyers in the antitrust authorities;  
i.e., (# Economists / # Lawyers). 
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Table 2: Means for Percentage Change in Per-Capita GDP, Antitrust Budget, Notified 
Transactions and Economists- Lawyer Ratio  
 Per Capita 
GDP 
Antitrust 
Budget 
Notified 
Transactions 
Economists-
Lawyer Ratio 
3.27 1.03 33.41 28.86 Argentina 
(17) (4) (2) (3) 
1.99 20.82 14.17 0.49 Australia 
(17) (14) (14) (3) 
1.87 53.66 -1.34 27.7 Austria 
(17) (5) (10) (6) 
1.68 0.66 4.9 -0.86 Belgium 
(17) (6) (12) (9) 
1.38 2.5 71.03 -21.87 Brazil 
(17) (6) (12) (4) 
1.77 6.94 4.69 -4.29 Canada 
(17) (14) (15) (14) 
2.11 19.17 24.87 -3.87 Czech Republic 
(17) (14) (13) (14) 
1.88 6.62 -13.09 -5.5 Denmark 
(17) (14) (5) (12) 
1.62 9.19 15.78 4.2 EU 
(17) (7) (13) (4) 
2.14 6.2 -3.47 2.04 Finland 
(17) (10) (8) (9) 
1.41 37.13 -12.17 . France 
(17) (8) (7) (0) 
1.52 4.21 3.58 -0.91 Germany 
(17) (14) (15) (14) 
2.57 83.3 23.75 34.54 Greece 
(17) (7) (7) (4) 
2.28 55.71 16.77 -2.45 Hungary 
(17) (12) (10) (12) 
5.1 21.92 14.97 10.73 Ireland 
(17) (9) (11) (12) 
1.11 . 8.59 0 Italy 
(17) (0) (13) (1) 
1.19 4.61 -7.79 . Japan 
(17) (15) (14) (0) 
1.68 13.93 4.02 7.07 Mexico 
(17) (9) (9) (9) 
2.06 22.14 0.88 -14.03 Netherlands 
(17) (9) (9) (2) 
1.87 8.41 -8.39 30.37 New Zealand 
(17) (8) (10) (8) 
2.57 3.62 7.79 -4.91 Norway 
(17) (13) (10) (11) 
3.95 18.08 44.89 -1.88 Poland 
(17) (9) (10) (10) 
1.73 27.21 14.2 -18.52 Portugal 
(17) (6) (10) (6) 
0.86 54.13 511.57 . Russia 
(17) (7) (2) (0) 
4.82 17.4 16.78 -5.97 S. Korea 
(17) (14) (14) (10) 
2.82 15.34 29.18 8.85 Slovakia 
(17) (10) (15) (10) 
2.19 12.88 18.81 0.92 Spain 
(17) (5) (12) (4) 
1.96 3.47 -7.54 -4.17 Sweden 
(17) (14) (10) (10) 
0.69 9.1 32.32 -1.89 Switzerland 
(17) (11) (8) (8) 
2.59 76.98 18.04 6.51 Turkey 
(17) (7) (8) (3) 
2.13 9.95 -3.95 1.22 United Kingdom 
(17) (11) (13) (10) 
1.78 6.49 5.19 0.07 United States 
(17) (15) (14) (14) 
2.14 18.05 15.04 1.45 SUM 
(544) (307) (335) (236) 
() = # observations 
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Table 3: Regression Results for Growth Equations 
 
 
Annual Data 
 
5-Year-Average Data 
Regression Model: #1 #2 #3  #4 #5 #6 
Variables OLS 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
  
OLS 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Antitrust-Budgett-1 8.152*** 14.02*** 14.31*  10.59** 15.36** 20.62** 
  (in billions) (2.728) (4.082) (7.598)  (4.489) (6.482) (8.924) 
Per-Capita-GDPt-1 -0.108*** -0.224*** -0.825***  -0.134*** -0.175*** -0.228 
  (in thousands) (0.0295) (0.0448) (0.262)  (0.0414) (0.0663) (0.140) 
Physical-Capitalt 0.0794** 0.147* 0.472***  -0.0321 -0.0644 0.119 
 (0.0393) (0.0764) (0.147)  (0.0650) (0.0708) (0.249) 
Opennesst 0.0338*** 0.0407** 0.171**  0.0266** 0.0285** 0.112* 
 (0.00782) (0.0164) (0.0764)  (0.0122) (0.0135) (0.0616) 
Human-Capitalt-i -0.00390 -0.0173 0.0477  -0.0241 -0.0638 -0.401*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0428) (0.118)  (0.0426) (0.0487) (0.130) 
Population-Growtht 0.0799 -0.193 -0.235  0.0179 0.146 -0.0405 
 (0.261) (0.400) (0.673)  (0.384) (0.400) (0.868) 
Inflationt-1 -0.0441** -0.0653* -0.0750***  -0.0433** -0.0643*** -0.0448 
 (0.0179) (0.0385) (0.0253)  (0.0201) (0.0215) (0.0622) 
Unemploymentt 0.0538 -0.0234 -0.139  0.0841 0.0642 0.218 
 (0.0405) (0.0637) (0.115)  (0.0586) (0.0864) (0.252) 
Government- 0.700 2.116** 2.257**  0.535 1.044 5.598*** 
Effectivenesst (0.450) (0.954) (1.060)  (0.627) (0.743) (1.230) 
Observations 242 242 242  42 42 42 
R2 0.350  0.522  0.616  0.924 
*denotes p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors are in parentheses; robust standard errors employed for random 
and fixed effects 
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Figure 1: Mean Change in Antitrust-Budget & Notified-Transactions by Year for All 
Authorities 
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Figure 2: Annual Percentage of Notified-Transactions Eliciting Merger Policy Actions 
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Figure 3: Annual Ratio of Economists to Lawyers 
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